On February 28, 2026, the same night that the United States and Israel launched the strikes on Iranian nuclear and military infrastructure that triggered
the 2026 Iran war, Iran launched a large retaliatory salvo of drones and ballistic missiles targeting American and allied military facilities across the Middle
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Key Developments
East.
Several projectiles in this retaliatory strike crossed into Jordanian airspace, where the Jordanian Armed Forces – working in coordination with United States Armed Forces
operating in Jordan under the long-standing US-Jordan defense partnership – intercepted the incoming missiles and drones before they could reach their targets.
Background and Context
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Jordan’s participation in the interception operations was defensive in nature: Jordanian air defenses engaged incoming projectiles that were transiting Jordanian airspace regardless of their
ultimate targets, and Jordan did not launch offensive strikes against Iran or participate in the February 28 US-Israeli attacking action.
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Nonetheless, Iran subsequently conducted dedicated strikes against Jordan in retaliation for what Tehran characterized as Jordanian military cooperation with the US-Israeli attacks on Iran.
The 2026 Iranian strikes on Jordan encompassed attacks on US military facilities hosted in Jordanian territory, including the Al-Tanf garrison and bases in the
eastern Jordan desert region that the US maintains as part of its regional force structure and that have been the subject of Iranian-backed militia
attacks since 2023.
Iran’s logic in targeting Jordan alongside more direct participants in the February 28 strikes reflected its doctrine that all states hosting US military facilities
that facilitate attacks on Iran are legitimate targets for retaliation, a doctrine that, if applied comprehensively, would implicate virtually every GCC state and several
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Jordan’s position – hosting US forces as a matter of its defense relationship with Washington but not itself participating in offensive operations – placed
it in the same legal and diplomatic gray zone that Kuwait occupied when the Kuwait airport was struck: a country targeted not for its
own military actions but for its partnership with the United States.
Jordan condemned the Iranian strikes strongly, with King Abdullah II and Prime Minister Jaafar Hassan describing the attacks as a violation of Jordanian sovereignty
and demanding through diplomatic channels that Iran acknowledge and apologize for the strikes.
Jordan referred the matter to the UN Security Council and engaged in consultations with the Arab League, both of which issued statements supporting Jordan’s
position and condemning Iranian attacks on non-combatant Arab states.
Jordan also reinforced its air defense systems along its eastern border following the February 28 incident, accepting enhanced US assistance for its missile defense
capabilities in a pattern that deepened Jordan’s security dependence on Washington even as Amman sought to maintain diplomatic channels with Tehran.
The strikes on Jordan illustrated how the Iran war diffused across the Middle East in ways that affected states far beyond the direct parties
– the US, Israel, and Iran – to the initial conflict, creating a regional security emergency that tested the diplomatic capabilities of every Arab
government simultaneously.
The ultimate resolution through the June 14 ceasefire MOU came 15 weeks after Jordan had first been drawn into a conflict it had not
sought and did not participate in offensively.
The pattern of Iranian strikes on Kuwait, Jordan, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Bahrain during the Iran war created a rare moment of
near-unity among Arab states in condemning Iranian military action, with even states that had previously maintained warmer relations with Tehran – including Oman, which
has historically served as an informal communications channel between Iran and the West – issuing strong condemnations of Iranian attacks on Arab soil.
The political fallout for Iran from having struck the civilian airport of Kuwait, targeted US facilities in Jordan, and launched attacks on energy infrastructure
in Saudi Arabia and the UAE will affect its relationships with Arab states well into the post-conflict period, regardless of the formal ceasefire framework
that the June 14 MOU establishes.
Arab states that had been cautiously rebuilding relationships with Iran following the Saudi-Iran normalization of 2023 will reassess the pace and depth of that
normalization in light of Iran’s willingness to target Arab civilian and economic infrastructure during the 2026 conflict.
Sources: Reuters – Ukraine | BBC News – Ukraine | NPR – Ukraine
Sources and Further Reading
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