The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) today, June 20, 2026, delivered a significant ruling, allowing a civil action alleging election interference against Alberta’s Chief Electoral Officer (CEO) to proceed to trial. In the case of *Resler v. Anglin*, 2026 SCC 23, the Court unanimously dismissed the CEO’s appeal, confirming that an unsuccessful provincial election candidate, Joseph Anglin, may continue his lawsuit against Glen Resler for alleged bad faith conduct during the 2015 election campaign.

This landmark decision clarifies the boundaries between public and private law remedies, affirming that tort claims, specifically misfeasance in public office, can be pursued against public officials when allegations of intentional wrongful conduct and bad faith are properly pleaded. The ruling underscores the principle of accountability for public officers, even within the sensitive context of election administration.

The Court’s judgment means that Mr. Anglin’s claim, which seeks substantial damages including for loss of a chance to be re-elected, will now move forward to be heard on its merits in an Alberta court. This development sets an important precedent for how allegations of misconduct by election officials are handled in Canada.

Supreme Court Upholds Candidate’s Right to Sue Alberta CEO

The civil action stems from the 2015 Alberta provincial election, where Joseph Anglin was an unsuccessful candidate for re-election as a Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA). During the campaign, Alberta’s Chief Electoral Officer, Glen Resler, ordered the removal of at least 25 of Mr. Anglin’s election signs due to alleged non-compliance with the Election Act. Following the election, Mr. Resler also fined Mr. Anglin after an investigation concluded he had failed to protect the list of electors provided to him.

Mr. Anglin accepted the election result but sought judicial review of the CEO’s decisions. While the court upheld the sign-removal decision as reasonable, the penalty related to the electors list was ultimately rescinded on procedural fairness grounds. Subsequently, Mr. Anglin initiated a civil action against Mr. Resler, alleging that the CEO had specifically targeted him with improper or ulterior motives, negatively impacting his re-election prospects.

Mr. Anglin’s lawsuit seeks 2.2 million dollars in damages. This includes 400,000 dollars for the loss of a chance of being re-elected, 400,000 dollars for loss of future employment as an MLA, 400,000 dollars for harm to his reputation, emotional well-being, and future employment opportunities, and 1 million dollars in punitive damages. The CEO moved to strike the claim, arguing it was frivolous and that he was immune from liability.

Rejection of Legal Barriers to Misfeasance Claim

Justice Moreau, writing for the majority of the Supreme Court, systematically rejected the four primary barriers raised by the CEO to prevent the claim from proceeding. These arguments included collateral attack, abuse of process, parliamentary privilege, and statutory immunity under the Election Act.

The Court found that the doctrine of collateral attack was not engaged because Mr. Anglin’s claim did not seek to indirectly invalidate the election result or circumvent the statutory controverted elections procedure. Instead, it sought damages for alleged misconduct, a private law remedy distinct from public law challenges to election validity. This distinction is crucial for understanding the scope of such legal actions.

Similarly, the claim was not deemed an abuse of process. It did not aim to challenge the election outcome or relitigate issues already decided during judicial review. The focus remained on the alleged intentional wrongful conduct of the public official, rather than the legitimacy of the election itself.

Parliamentary privilege, which protects the legislative assembly’s authority and integrity, was also found not to bar the claim. Justice Moreau clarified that the lawsuit did not relate to the integrity of the election or the legislature’s power to determine its own membership. This ensures that claims against individual officials for bad faith actions do not infringe upon the broader constitutional principles of parliamentary independence.

Crucially, the Court addressed the statutory immunity clause within the Election Act, which shields the CEO from civil actions for duties performed in good faith. Justice Moreau emphasized that this immunity is expressly limited to acts done in good faith, thereby leaving the door open for civil liability in cases of intentional or bad faith conduct. This interpretation aligns with the textual analysis maxim of *expressio unius est exclusio alterius*, meaning the explicit mention of good faith implies the exclusion of bad faith from immunity.

The tort of misfeasance in public office, central to Mr. Anglin’s claim, sits at the intersection of private and public law. It applies when a public official intentionally misuses public power for an unlawful purpose, causing harm. While the Court affirmed that such claims can proceed when properly pleaded, it also reiterated that establishing misfeasance in public office is a high bar, requiring proof of both bad faith and material damage. This tort is not a free-for-all for civil claims against public officials, as highlighted in discussions around how to file a small claims court case, which often involves less complex legal thresholds.

Divisions on Loss of Chance Damages

A notable point of division among the justices concerned whether to strike the claim for damages based on the loss of a chance to be re-elected and earn income as an MLA. The majority, led by Justice Moreau, declined to strike this head of damages at this preliminary stage.

Justice Moreau noted that the availability of loss of chance damages in tort law remains unsettled and that the issue had not been fully explored in the lower court decisions. She deferred the final determination to the trial judge, who would address the appropriate measure of damages should Mr. Anglin successfully establish his claim, including whether such damages are sustainable in fact and in law. This approach allows for a more thorough evidentiary record to be developed.

However, Justice Karakatsanis, writing on behalf of Chief Justice Wagner and Justice Martin, issued a partial dissent on this point. She argued that the claim for loss of chance damages should be struck as unavailable for the loss of an election. Her reasoning centered on the impossibility of proving causation in an election context, given the unpredictable nature of voter behavior and the multitude of factors influencing election outcomes. This perspective suggests that such claims are inherently speculative.

Furthermore, Justice Karakatsanis raised significant public policy concerns. She contended that allowing such damages would require courts to effectively decide whether election results were compromised by misconduct, potentially undermining public confidence in election outcomes and key democratic institutions. This echoes broader debates about the role of courts in electoral matters, a topic that sometimes intersects with discussions on political crisis deepens in other nations.

Justice Rowe, joined by Justice Côté, wrote a concurring opinion cautioning against deciding novel or complex issues that were not fully litigated on appeal or addressed by lower courts. He also expressed disagreement with using free-standing public policy grounds to strike a claim, particularly when those grounds mirrored concerns already rejected as barriers to the claim itself. This nuanced debate highlights the complexities of legal remedies in unique electoral contexts, a challenge also seen in cases involving facial recognition privacy lawsuit settlements where damages are difficult to quantify.

Implications for Public Accountability and Election Integrity

This decision by the Supreme Court of Canada carries significant implications for the accountability of public officials, particularly those involved in administering elections. By allowing a civil claim for misfeasance in public office to proceed against a Chief Electoral Officer, the Court reinforces the principle that public power, when exercised in bad faith, can lead to personal liability for damages. This serves as a critical check on potential abuses of authority, ensuring that officials are not entirely shielded by statutory immunities when their conduct is intentionally wrongful.

The ruling also delineates the distinct roles of public law remedies, such as judicial review, and private law tort claims. While judicial review addresses the legality and reasonableness of administrative decisions, misfeasance in public office provides a mechanism for individuals to seek redress for personal harm caused by a public official’s bad faith actions. This dual approach strengthens the overall framework for upholding the rule of law and protecting citizens from arbitrary or malicious state action. The case underscores the importance of a robust legal system that can address both systemic and individual grievances, a principle that also underpins efforts to protect your personal data through legal means.